Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral Psychology of Indirect Agency by Paharia, Neeru et al.
 
Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral Psychology of Indirect Agency
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Paharia, Neeru, Karim S. Kassam, Joshua D. Greene, and Max H.
Bazerman. 2009. Dirty work, clean hands: The moral psychology
of indirect agency. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 109(2): 134-141.
Published Version doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.03.002
Accessed February 18, 2015 5:41:36 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4264764
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAPIndirect Agency -1- 
  1 
 
 
  Running head: INDIRECT AGENCY 
 
 
Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral Psychology of Indirect Agency 
 Indirect Agency -2- 
  2 
ABSTRACT 
When powerful people cause harm, they often do so indirectly through other people. Are harmful 
actions carried out through others evaluated less negatively than harmful actions carried out 
directly? Four experiments examine the moral psychology of indirect agency.  Experiments 1A, 
1B, and 1C reveal effects of indirect agency under conditions favoring intuitive judgment, but 
not reflective judgment, using a joint/separate evaluation paradigm. Experiment 2A demonstrates 
that effects of indirect agency cannot be fully explained by perceived lack of foreknowledge or 
control on the part of the primary agent. Experiment 2B indicates that reflective moral judgment 
is sensitive to indirect agency, but only to the extent that indirectness signals reduced 
foreknowledge and/or control. Experiment 3 indicates that effects of indirect agency result from 
a failure to automatically consider the potentially dubious motives of agents who cause harm 
indirectly. Experiment 4 demonstrates an effect of indirect agency on purchase intentions. 
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Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral Psychology of Indirect Agency 
In 2005, Merck, a major pharmaceutical company, sold the rights to two slow-selling 
cancer drugs, Mustargen and Cosmegen, to smaller and lesser-known Ovation Pharmaceuticals. 
Merck’s decision to sell the rights to sell the drugs had dire consequences for dependent users, 
some of whom saw their monthly drug costs jump from $160 to $1,100 after Ovation raised the 
price (Berenson, 2006). The price increase was not based on changes in cost, and Merck 
continued to manufacture the drugs. Merck didn’t directly increase the price, and it’s not certain 
that they profited from it, but it is likely that the pharmaceutical giant foresaw the price increase 
and shared at least indirectly in the resulting profit. That is, Merck presumably profited from the 
increased price to consumers, either through its sale price to Ovation or its revenues from 
manufacturing the drugs. Were Merck’s actions ethical? And did the indirect nature of their 
actions affect how they were perceived? 
When powerful people do morally questionable things, they rarely interact directly with 
their putative victims. Mobsters have hit men. CEO’s have vice presidents, lawyers, and 
accountants. More specifically, the powerful are likely to carry out their intentions through the 
actions of other agents, with varying degrees of explicit direction and control. The present 
investigation explores the effects of indirect agency on moral judgment. 
Jones (1991) suggests that ethical decision making is “issue contingent.”  That is, ethical 
decisions and behaviors are affected by the magnitude of the consequences, social consensus, 
proximity, probability of the effect, temporal immediacy, and concentration of the effect.  
Together, these variables affect the moral intensity of the ethical decision (Jones, 1991). For 
example, an act that harms 1,000 people would be more morally intense than the same act that Indirect Agency -4- 
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harms only 10, and an act that harms someone in one’s own city is more morally intense than an 
act that harms someone in far away in another country. Moral issues of high intensity are both 
more salient (due to consequences) and more vivid (due to emotional arousal) than moral issues 
of low intensity. Furthermore, proximity, the element of moral intensity that we are most 
interested in, may affect perceived control and attributions of responsibility. Jones’s theories 
suggest that harms carried out directly will be more morally intense than harms carried out 
indirectly.  
 Recent work in moral psychology examines the roles played by various forms of 
physical indirectness in the evaluation of harmful actions (Royzman & Baron, 2002; Waldmann 
& Dieterich, 2007; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & 
Cohen, 2001; Greene, Lindsell, Clarke, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Royzman & Baron (2002), 
for example, contrast moving someone in front of oneself in order to block an incoming bullet 
(direct) with jumping out of a bullet’s path, exposing someone else as a target (indirect). The 
present research differs from the foregoing in two key respects. First, it is not focused on 
physical indirectness. Had Merck raised the prices of its drugs directly, rather than selling the 
rights to Ovation, the physical chain of events connecting Merck to its disappointed customers 
would not necessarily have been any shorter. The indirectness in question is psychological, not 
physical. Second, the indirectness in question concerns the role of secondary agents. Merck (the 
primary agent) acted indirectly in the present sense because it acted through Ovation (the 
secondary agent).  
Milgram (1974) examined the role of secondary agents in a variant of his classic 
obedience experiment. He found that subjects were even more likely to shock a victim (when 
directed by an authority figure) when the subjects were allowed to act through a secondary agent Indirect Agency -5- 
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(another confederate of the experimenter) who could be directed to administer shocks to the 
victim from a remote location. Milgram proposed that the presence of a secondary agent created 
psychological distance between the subject and the victim, and that this distance reduced the 
strain on the participant and made disobedience less likely. Milgram’s experiments suggest that 
the presence of secondary agents can reduce strain for the actor, but do not address the question 
of how observers perceive harmful actions that are carried out through secondary agents.  
  We conducted four experiments to examine the moral psychology of indirect agency. 
Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C document the effects of indirect agency under conditions favoring 
intuitive vs. reflective judgment. Experiments 2A and 2B aim to determine whether effects of 
indirect agency result from uncertainty concerning the primary agent’s foreknowledge of, or 
control over, harmful outcomes. Experiment 3 tests the hypothesis that effects of indirect agency 
result from a failure to automatically consider the potentially dubious motives of agents who 
cause harm indirectly. And Experiment 4 moves from judging the ethicality of decisions to the 
conditions under which indirect agency affects purchase intention. 
EXPERIMENTS 1A-C  
In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of indirect agency under two distinct modes of 
evaluation: separate evaluation and joint evaluation. Under joint evaluation, multiple alternatives 
are simultaneously available for consideration, while under separate evaluation only one 
alternative is considered (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992). For example, Bazerman, 
Schroth, Shah, Diekmann, & Tenbrunsel (1994) asked MBA students which of two options they 
would prefer: a job paying an annual salary of $75,000 while their classmates also made $75,000 
(the fair option), or a job paying $85,000 while their classmates made $95,000 (the money 
option). Students exhibited different preferences based on how the scenarios were presented. Indirect Agency -6- 
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When presented separately, participants reported that they would be more likely to accept the 
fair option than the money option, despite the reduced salary. When the two options were 
evaluated jointly, however, the relationship was reversed, with participants more likely to accept 
the money option even though it seemed less fair. Students who saw the scenarios one at a time 
based their judgments more on fairness, an emotionally salient factor that can be evaluated in the 
absence of information about alternative outcomes. Those who saw scenarios together focused 
on absolute salary level, a factor made salient when both options are presented together and that 
most people, upon reflection, regard as the more important factor. 
The tendency for separate evaluation to engender affective or intuitive judgment, and for 
joint evaluation to engender more cognitive or reflective judgment is not specific to this 
particular scenario (Hsee, Rottenstreich & Xiao, 2005; Hsee, Blount, Loewenstein, and 
Bazerman, 1999; Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benozi, 1998).  In another study, Hsee (1996) 
asked participants to evaluate second-hand music dictionaries either separately or jointly. In 
separate evaluation, participants stated they would be willing to pay more for a dictionary with 
10,000 entries whose condition was ‘like new,’ whereas in the joint evaluation condition 
participants said they would pay more for a 20,000 entry dictionary whose cover was torn. The 
dictionary’s aesthetic properties were intuitively evaluable to participants and thus dominated 
separate evaluation. But in joint evaluation, the difference in number of entries was salient and 
became the more important factor. In general, joint evaluation allows for the consideration of 
attributes that are difficult to assess in isolation and is therefore more likely to result in reason-
based choice and less likely to be influenced by affective factors (Hsee 1998; Bazerman et al., 
1998).  Indirect Agency -7- 
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In Experiment 1, we used a joint/separate evaluation paradigm to document the effects of 
indirect agency, pitting the effect of indirectness against another relevant factor, the magnitude 
of harmful consequences. Some scholars would argue that an effect of indirect agency is a bias 
(Royzman and Baron, 2002). For example, few would explicitly argue that a murderous mobster 
is less culpable if he acts through a hit man rather than pulling the trigger himself. Thus, we 
predict that effects of indirect agency, insofar as they exist, are more likely to be present under 
conditions favoring intuition (separate evaluation). But, if the comparison between indirect and 
direct agency is made more transparent under conditions favoring reflection (joint evaluation), 
the blame reduction for indirect agency will be reduced or eliminated and the consequences will 
be more salient. This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Under separate evaluation, people will judge unethical acts more leniently when 
carried out indirectly than when carried out directly (even if the acts carried out indirectly entail 
greater harm).  
H1b: Joint evaluation will reduce or eliminate the indirect vs. direct effect predicted 
under H1a.   
 
Experiment 1A employed hypothetical scenarios modeled after the case of Merck and 
Ovation. In the direct scenario, the larger company directly raised the price of the drug, imposing 
hardship on patients. In the indirect scenario, the larger company sold the drug rights to the 
smaller company that went on to raise the price higher than the larger company did in the direct 
scenario, imposing even greater hardship on patients. We predicted that participants would find 
indirect action (with more severe consequences) to be less unethical when alternatives were Indirect Agency -8- 
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presented separately, but that people would reverse their preferences when the alternatives were 
presented jointly. Experiments 1B and 1C tested the same hypotheses using alternative scenarios. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1A 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred and fifty people (128 females Mage = 32.7, SD = 10.0) recruited from an 
online subject pool completed the survey and a package of unrelated surveys in exchange for $5.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: separate evaluation – 
direct sale (SE-direct), separate evaluation – indirect sale (SE-indirect), or joint evaluation (JE). 
In the SE-direct condition, participants read the following scenario:  
A major pharmaceutical company, X, had a cancer drug that was minimally profitable. 
The fixed costs were high and the market was limited. But, the patients who used the 
drug really needed it. The pharmaceutical was making the drug for $2.50/pill (all costs 
included), and was only selling it for $3/pill. [The pharmaceutical firm raised the price of 
the drug from $3/pill to $9/pill, thus increasing the value of the drug to company X by 
$10 million.]  
In the SE-indirect condition, the text in brackets was replaced with the following: “The major 
pharmaceutical X sold the rights to a smaller pharmaceutical, Y, for $12 million. In order to re-
coop costs, company Y increased the price of the drug to $15/pill.” Indirect Agency -9- 
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All participants were asked “On a scale of 1 (not at all unethical) - 10 (very unethical), 
how unethical do you think company X's behavior was in this decision?” In the JE condition, the 
text in brackets was replaced with the following: 
Consider two cases in which the firm had either:  
Case A) Raised the price of the drug from $3/pill to $9/pill, thus raising the value of the 
drug to company X by $10 million, 
or 
Case B) Sold the rights to produce the drug to a smaller company Y for $12 million. In 
order to re-coop costs, company Y raised the price of the drug to $15/pill. 
Participants were then asked the following question:  “In which case would the behavior of 
company X have been more unethical?”  Participants responded using an eleven point scale 
anchored at -5 with “In terms of ethics, Case A is much worse than Case B”, at 0 with “In terms 
of ethics, the two cases are equally ethical/unethical”, and at 5 with “In terms of ethics, Case B is 
much worse than Case A”. We simultaneously manipulated indirectness and magnitude of harm 
in this experiment in order to generate a preference reversal. [Note: In Experiments 2A-2B we 
examine the effect of indirectness while controlling for magnitude of harm.]    
Following previous research (Bazerman et al., 1992), we asked participants in the joint 
condition an explicitly comparative question in order to enable a natural comparison of the two 
options, rather than using two independent rating scales for each option which would parallel the 
separate evaluation conditions.  The use of different scales necessitates a more conservative test 
of our hypothesis than the standard interaction that could have been tested if the same scales had 
been used in both conditions (i.e., it requires significant effects in opposing directions). Indirect Agency -10- 
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We had participants address questions of “ethicality” rather than “morality,” because the 
former term is more often used in business contexts such as those described in our scenarios.  
Students in professional schools of business or medicine might take a course in “ethics,” but are 
unlikely to take a course in “morality.” 
 
Results 
Results – Separate Evaluation 
SE results revealed a significant effect of directness, t(77) = 3.13, p < .005, indicating 
that the SE-direct price increase was rated as significantly more unethical (M = 6.85, SD = 2.47) 
than the SE-indirect price increase (M = 5.05, SD = 2.84). 
Results – Joint Evaluation 
The JE condition was analyzed using a one-sample t-test with zero (scale midpoint) as the 
test value. The results revealed a significant effect t(70) = 2.88, p = .005, indicating that the 
indirect price increase was rated as more unethical (M = .94, SD = 2.76) when the two cases were 
seen together.  
EXPERIMENT 1B 
We investigated whether the same pattern observed in Experiment 1A would replicate in 
other business contexts. In Experiment 1B, instead of looking the direct and indirect implication 
of a drug sale, we looked at toxic waste clean up. In the direct condition, a well-known real 
estate company X decided to only clean up 40% of the toxic waste on the land of a new housing 
development. In the indirect condition, they sell the land to a lesser-known company, Y, who 
does not engage in any clean up effort. We predicted that the direct condition would be viewed Indirect Agency -11- 
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less favorably in separate evaluations, but that the indirect condition would be viewed less 
favorably in the joint evaluation. 
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and sixty-five participants (84 females, Mage = 23.62, SD = 11.01) were 
recruited on or around Harvard University campus. A candy bar was offered as incentive. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: separate evaluation – 
direct (SE-direct), separate evaluation – indirect (SE-indirect), or joint evaluation (JE). In the 
SE-direct condition, participants read the following scenario:  
A well-known real estate developer, X, owned a piece of property that they wished to 
construct new housing units on. The property contained some health-threatening toxic 
substances that would require a substantial amount of clean-up, and was worth $50 
million dollars as is. It would require $30 million to fully clean the land, but the value 
would only go up to $60 million. [The housing developer decided to only invest $12 
million in a 40% clean up effort, and the value of the land went up to $54 million. They 
built housing units on the land, all of which have now been sold.] 
In the SE-indirect condition, the text in brackets was replaced with the following: “The housing 
developer sold the land to a lesser known developer, Y, without cleanup. The lesser-known 
developer invested no money in any clean up effort and built housing units on the land, all of 
which have now been sold.” Indirect Agency -12- 
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All participants were asked “On a scale of 1 (not at all unethical) - 10 (very unethical), 
how unethical do you think company X's behavior was in this decision?” In the JE condition, the 
text in brackets was replaced with the following: 
Consider two cases in which the developer had either:  
Case A) Invested only $12 million in a 40% clean up effort and the value of the land went 
up to $54 million. They built housing units on the land, all of which have now been sold. 
or 
Case B) The housing developer sold the land to a lesser known developer, Y, without 
cleanup. The lesser-known developer invested no money in any clean up effort, and built 
housing units on the land, all of which have now been sold. 
Participants were then asked:  “In which case would the behavior of company X have been more 
unethical?”  Participants responded using the same scale used in Experiment 1A. 
Results – Separate Evaluation 
The results revealed a significant effect, t(86) = 2.38, p < .05, indicating that the direct 
condition was rated as significantly more unethical (M = 7.09, SD = 2.40) than the indirect 
condition (M = 5.80, SD = 2.68). 
Results – Joint Evaluation 
The results revealed a significant effect t(76) = 3.47, p < .01, indicating that the indirect 
scenario was rated as more unethical (M = 1.17, SD = 2.96) when the two cases were seen 
together. 
EXPERIMENT 1C 
Experiment 1C followed the format of Experiments 1A and 1B but in an air pollution 
domain. In the direct condition, a well-known electricity producer company X turned down their Indirect Agency -13- 
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pollution controls on a coal factory by 50% to increase their profit from $1 to $2, resulting in 
25% more pollution. In the indirect condition company X sold the factory to a lesser-known 
company Y who turned down the pollution controls by 75% to increase profit from $1 to $4, 
resulting in 75% more pollution. We predicted that the direct condition would be viewed less 
favorably in separate evaluations, but that the indirect condition would be viewed less favorably 
in the joint evaluation. 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-nine participants (35 females, Mage = 25.62, SD = 13.56) were recruited on or 
around Harvard University campus. A candy bar was offered as incentive. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: separate evaluation – 
direct (SE-direct), separate evaluation – indirect (SE-indirect), or joint evaluation (JE). In the 
SE-direct condition, participants read the following scenario:  
A major electricity producer, company X, owned a factory that produced power out of 
coal. The factory was using a variety of pollution controls that helped the environment 
but reduced profitability.  Company X was earning a profit of $1.00 per unit of energy 
produced. [Company X reduced the use of pollution controls by 50% and increased their 
profit margin from $1.00 to $2.00 per unit of energy produced. The value of their factory 
went up to $8 million. However, by turning down the pollution controls, the amount of 
pollution emitted from the factory increased by 25%.] 
In the SE-indirect condition, the text in brackets was replaced with the following: “Company X 
sold the factory to a lesser-known company Y for $12 million dollars. In order to recoup costs, Indirect Agency -14- 
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company Y reduced the use of pollution controls by 75% and increased their profit margin from 
$1.00 to $4.00 to per unit of energy produced. However, by turning down the pollution controls, 
the amount of pollution emitted from this factory increased by 75%.” 
All participants were asked “On a scale of 1 (not at all unethical) - 10 (very unethical), 
how unethical do you think company X's behavior was in this decision?” In the JE condition, the 
text in brackets was replaced with the following: 
Consider two cases in which the firm had either: 
Case A) Reduced the use of pollution controls by 50% and increased their profit margin 
from $1.00 to $2.00 per unit of energy produced. The value of their factory went up to $8 
million. However, by turning down the pollution controls, the amount of pollution 
emitted from the factory increased by 25%.  
or 
Case B) Sold the factory to a lesser-known company, Y, for $12 million dollars. In order 
to re-coop costs, company Y reduced the use of pollution controls by 75% and increased 
their profit margin from $1.00 to $4.00 to per unit of energy produced. However, by 
turning down the pollution controls, the amount of pollution emitted from this factory 
increased by 75%. 
Participants were then asked:  “In which case would the behavior of company X have been more 
unethical?”  Participants responded using the same scale used in Experiments 1A and 1B. 
Results – Separate Evaluation 
The results revealed a significant effect, t(46) = 2.20, p < .05, indicating that the direct 
condition was rated as significantly more unethical (M = 6.92, SD = 2.0) than the indirect 
condition (M = 5.21, SD = 3.24). Indirect Agency -15- 
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Results – Joint Evaluation 
The joint evaluation condition was analyzed using a one-sample t-test with zero (scale 
midpoint) as the test value. The results revealed a significant effect t(20) = 5.27, p < .001, 
indicating that the indirect scenario was rated as more unethical (M = 2.81, SD = 2.44) when the 
two cases were seen together. 
Discussion 
When participants evaluated alternatives separately, participants were significantly more 
lenient in judging agents when harm was caused indirectly. When alternatives were assessed 
jointly, the effect of consequences replaced or dominated the effect of indirectness. This 
preference reversal suggests that the use of indirect agency has a significant impact on intuitive 
moral judgment, but that when participants are allowed to compare alternatives and reflect on 
their decisions, the indirectness of an action is seen as less important than the magnitude of its 
harmful consequences.  
EXPERIMENT 2A 
Indirect agency may attenuate moral condemnation because it is unclear whether the 
primary agent foresaw the resulting harm. We might assume that Merck foresaw dramatically 
increased prices when they sold their drugs to Ovation, but it’s possible that they did not. If 
Merck failed to foresee the harm they caused, they may be held less accountable for that reason 
(Young, Hauser & Saxe, 2007; Cushman, 2008). A second relevant factor is the primary agent’s 
proximity and perceived level of control over the secondary agent (Jones, 1991). A secondary 
agent may be seen as acting autonomously, or alternatively, as serving as an instrument of the 
primary agent (willingly or otherwise). For example, even if Merck correctly anticipates that Indirect Agency -16- 
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Ovation will raise the price (foreknowledge), the decision to raise the price may nevertheless be 
Ovation’s. A decrease in the perceived control of the primary agent may result in a perceived 
diffusion of responsibility (Darley and Latane, 1968) from the primary to the secondary agent. 
Making foreknowledge and control clear may partially eliminate the indirect bias encountered in 
Experiment 1; however, we maintain that the effect of indirect agency will not fully disappear 
when made under separate evaluations. Further, we predict that making foreknowledge and 
control clear in a joint evaluation will eliminate the indirect bias, suggesting the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: Under separate evaluation, people will judge unethical acts more leniently when 
carried out indirectly than when carried out directly (even if foreknowledge and control are made 
salient.).  
H2b: Joint evaluation will reduce or eliminate the indirect vs. direct effect predicted 
under H2a.   
 
In Experiments 2A and 2B, we included conditions in which the agent clearly had 
foreknowledge of the consequences, and in which the secondary agent was transparently an 
instrument of the primary agent.  (That is, the primary agent had both foreknowledge of and 
control over the harmful outcome.  Note that it is possible for the primary agent to have 
foreknowledge without control, but not vice versa.)  If a perceived lack of foreknowledge and/or 
control of the primary agent are driving the effect of indirect agency, judgments in these 
conditions should mirror judgments of direct action. We examined the effects of these factors on 
relatively intuitive versus relatively reflective judgments using separate evaluation in Experiment 
2A and joint evaluation in Experiment 2B. In Experiments 2A and 2B, unlike Experiment 1, the Indirect Agency -17- 
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magnitude of the harm was held constant across conditions/scenarios in order to better isolate the 
targeted effects. 
Method 
Participants 
Five hundred and eighteen Kentucky residents (301 females Mage = 44.3, SD = 13.85) 
were recruited through an online survey service to complete a group of unrelated surveys.  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four separate evaluation conditions: 1) 
direct, 2) indirect, 3) indirect — foreknowledge, and 4) indirect – control (foreknowledge + 
control). The direct and indirect conditions were nearly identical to the separate conditions run in 
Experiment 1A, except that in the indirect conditions, company Y only raised the price to $9 
rather than $15, and company X sold the drug to company Y for $10 million rather than $12 
million, thus holding the consequences constant between the direct and the indirect conditions at 
an increase to $9 per pill. The indirect – foreknowledge condition was identical to the indirect 
condition but with the addition of the following sentence to indicate foreknowledge: “Company 
X was aware that company Y would raise the price to $9/pill before the sale of the drug.” In the 
indirect – control condition, the text in brackets (see Experiment 1A) was replaced by the 
following to indicate both foreknowledge and control: 
Rather than brand and distribute the drug themselves incurring a cost of $100,000 to 
company X, they made a contract with company Y for this service. Under the contract, 
company Y agreed to sell the product under company Y's name and through their 
distribution channels for $9/pill. Company X paid company Y $100,000 for this service 
and increased the value of the drug to company X by $10 million. Indirect Agency -18- 
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The SE rating scale was the same as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Ratings of ethicality were analyzed using a one-way between subjects ANOVA with four 
conditions. The analysis revealed a significant effect, F(3, 514) = 5.36, p < .01. Planned 
comparisons revealed that company X was rated as significantly more unethical in the direct 
condition (M = 7.45, SD = 3.10) than in the indirect condition, (M = 5.85, SD = 3.37), the 
indirect — foreknowledge condition, (M = 6.35, SD = 3.05), and indirect – control condition (M 
= 6.62, SD = 3.25), t(514) = 3.88, p < .01, t(514) = 2.77, p < .01, and t(514) = 2.13, p = .03 
respectively (see Figure 1). The difference between the indirect and indirect – control conditions 
was marginally significant t(514) = 1.93, p = .054. The difference between the indirect and 
indirect — foreknowledge conditions was not significant t(514)=1.22, p = .22.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, actions carried out indirectly through secondary agents were deemed 
less unethical than actions carried out directly in separate evaluations favoring intuitive 
judgment. The results further suggest that indirectness is not merely a signal of reduced 
foreknowledge or control. Indirect actions were judged less unethical than direct actions even 
when the primary agent’s foreknowledge was made explicit. Even when the secondary agent was 
a transparent instrument of the primary agent, acting under contract such that the primary agent 
had full knowledge and control, the effect of indirect agency was not fully eliminated.  
In Experiment 2B, we examined the influence of the same two factors on reflective moral 
judgment by using joint evaluation.  Indirect Agency -19- 
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EXPERIMENT 2B 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four participants (25 females, Mage = 27.7, SD = 12.4) from the Cambridge, MA 
community participated in exchange for a candy bar. One participant failed to answer all 
questions and was excluded from the analysis. 
 
Procedure 
Participants rated the ethicality of company X in all four scenarios used in Experiment 
2A (direct, indirect, indirect – foreknowledge, and indirect – control) in a joint evaluation on the 
same ten point scales. The order of scenarios was fully randomized across subjects. 
Results  
Ratings of ethicality were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with condition 
(direct vs. indirect vs. indirect – foreknowledge vs. indirect – control) as the within-subjects 
factor. The analysis revealed a significant effect, F(3, 126) = 6.40, p < .01. Planned comparisons 
show that company X was rated as less unethical in the indirect condition (M = 4.56, SD = 2.91) 
than in the direct (M = 5.92, SD = 2.81), t(42) = 3.54, p < .01, indirect – foreknowledge (M = 
5.77, SD = 2.87), t(42) = 3.41, p < .01, and indirect – control conditions (M = 5.76, SD = 2.71), 
t(42) = 2.91, p < .01. There were no significant differences among the latter three conditions, all 
t’s < 1, all p’s > .6 (see Figure 2). 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] Indirect Agency -20- 
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Discussion 
Under conditions favoring reflective judgment (joint evaluation), participants did not 
distinguish between harm caused directly and harm caused indirectly when foreknowledge and 
control were explicitly attributed to the primary agent. However, indirect action was judged more 
leniently when the primary agent’s foreknowledge and/or degree of control were ambiguous. 
This suggests reflective moral judgment is sensitive to indirect agency, but only to the extent that 
indirectness signals reduced foreknowledge and/or reduced control on the part of the primary 
agent.  These results stand in contrast to those of Experiment 2A, where foreknowledge and 
control did not fully eliminate the indirectness bias. 
The results also serve to illuminate the findings of Experiment 1A, where the price of the 
pill was raised to $15 in the indirect condition, as opposed to only $9 in the direct condition. In 
Experiment 1A the action in the indirect condition was judged to be more unethical in a joint 
evaluation; the effect of consequences dominated the effect of indirectness.  Here, however, with 
the consequences held constant across conditions, indirect action was seen as less unethical than 
direct action when the primary agent’s degree of foreknowledge/control were ambiguous. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 tested an additional hypothesis concerning the mechanism behind the 
indirect agency effect: People who evaluate indirect actions in isolation (SE) respond relatively 
favorably to these actions because they are relatively unlikely to question the primary agent’s 
motives. Joint evaluation, in contrast, prompts people to consider the primary agent’s motives by 
drawing attention to the more straightforward alternative of direct action. This hypothesis 
predicts that the effect of indirect agency can be reduced or eliminated by first drawing people’s Indirect Agency -21- 
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attention to the possibility of dubious motives on the part of the primary agent, suggesting the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Highlighting a dubious motive will reduce the effect of indirect agency. 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred and forty-two participants (79 females Mage = 40.2, SD = 21.1) were 
recruited on or around the Harvard University campus. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: direct, indirect – motive-
first, or indirect – motive-last. The direct condition was identical to the direct condition in 
Experiment 2. The indirect – motive-first condition was identical to the indirect – foreknowledge 
condition in Experiment 2, but with the addition of the following text, presented prior to the 
ethicality rating scale: 
Company X decided to sell the drug to company Y rather than increase the price and 
market the drug themselves. One possible motive for selling to company Y is that 
company X was worried that raising the price would cause negative press. Selling to 
company Y avoids the negative reputation that might result from a large increase in drug 
price. 
Next, participants indicated the extent to which they believed that this motive was influential in 
company X’s decision. They used a ten point scale anchored by Not at all Influential and Very 
Influential. In the indirect – motive-last condition, the additional text and the motive-influence 
scale were presented after the ethicality scale. The indirect-motive last condition was thus similar Indirect Agency -22- 
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to the indirect-foreknowledge condition from Experiment 2, and was included to demonstrate 
that participants’ perceptions of motive did not depend on question order.  
 
Results  
Ratings of ethicality were analyzed using a one-way, between-subjects ANOVA (direct 
vs. indirect – motive-first vs. indirect – motive-last). The analysis revealed a significant effect on 
ethicality ratings, F(2, 141) = 6.88, p <  .01. Planned comparisons revealed that company X was 
rated as significantly more unethical in both the direct (M = 6.36, SD = 2.44) and indirect 
motive-first (M = 5.42, SD = 2.64) conditions than in the indirect – motive-last condition (M = 
4.40, SD = 2.60), t(141) = 3.71, p < .01 and t(141) = 1.99, p < .05 respectively. The difference 
between the direct and indirect motive-first conditions was marginal, t(141) = 1.78, p = .08. 
Ratings of the motive’s influence did not differ significantly between the indirect – 
motive-first (M = 6.60, SD = 2.17) and indirect – motive-last (M = 5.98, SD = 2.31) conditions, 
t(98) = 1.38, p > .16. 
Discussion 
As predicted, participants who considered the possibility of dubious motives prior to 
evaluating company X’s behavior (indirect – motive-first) rated the behavior as more unethical 
than those prompted to consider dubious motive afterwards (indirect – motive-last). The motive-
first manipulation did not completely eliminate the effect of indirect agency, but did reduce the 
size of the effect, despite the fact that participants’ ratings of motive influence did not differ 
significantly between conditions. In other words, considering a potentially dubious motive Indirect Agency -23- 
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significantly changed participants’ ethicality ratings, but rating ethicality did not have a 
significant impact on considerations of that motive.   
EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 4 extends the work of Experiments 1-3 by examining the influence of 
indirect agency on purchase intentions. Experiment 4 also broadens the implications of indirect 
agency to a case where employees, rather than consumers, are the target of harm, and where the 
research participant (in the position of the consumer) rather than a company is the perpetrator.  
Thus, we examine the role of indirect agency on consumer purchase intention, rather than 
examining the judgments of the ethics of others. 
 Participants completed an online survey in which they reported their likelihood of hiring 
an underpaid domestic worker either directly or indirectly through an employment agency. We 
predicted that people would be more tolerant of indirect agency under separate evaluations, and 
as a result more willing to severely underpay a worker. More specifically, we hypothesize: 
 
H4a: Under separate evaluation, participants will report a greater willingness to purchase 
underpaid labor when the transaction is indirect than when it is direct (even when the 
consequences to the employee are more severe). 
H4b:  Joint evaluation will reduce or eliminate the indirect vs. direct effect predicted 
under H4a.   
  Indirect Agency -24- 
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Method 
Participants 
Seven-hundred and forty-three participants (477 females Mage = 34.5, SD = 10.9) were 
recruited through an online survey service to complete a group of unrelated surveys.  
 
Procedure 
Paralleling Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions: separate evaluation – direct (SE-direct), separate evaluation – indirect (SE-
indirect), or joint evaluation (JE). In the SE-direct condition, participants read the following 
scenario:  
Imagine that you have the opportunity to hire a domestic worker who is willing to accept 
$7 per hour to clean your house. To live above the poverty level in your area would 
require a wage that was closer to $8 per hour, the current minimum wage.  
In the SE-indirect condition, participants read the following:  
Imagine that you have the opportunity to hire a firm called Super Cleaners to clean your 
house. You pay Super Cleaners $6.50 for every hour a domestic worker cleans your 
house. To live above the poverty level in your area would require a wage that was closer 
to $8 per hour, the current minimum wage.  
 
In the JE condition, participants were asked “Please consider the following two scenarios:  
Situation A) Imagine that you have the opportunity to hire a domestic worker who is 
willing to accept $7 per hour to clean your house. To live above the poverty level in your 
area would require a wage that was closer to $8 per hour, the current minimum wage.  Indirect Agency -25- 
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Situation B) Imagine that you have the opportunity to hire a firm called Super Cleaners to 
clean your house. You pay Super Cleaners $6.50 for every hour a domestic worker cleans 
your house. To live above the poverty level in your area would require a wage that was 
closer to $8 per hour, the current minimum wage.  
In the SE conditions participants were asked “How likely would you be to hire this domestic 
worker for $7?” in the direct condition and, “How likely would you be to hire Super Cleaners for 
$6.50?” in the indirect condition on scales from 0 (not likely) to 10 (very likely). In the JE 
condition participants were asked both questions on the same scale simultaneously.  
 
Results – Separate Evaluation 
The results revealed a marginally significant effect, t(502) = 1.88, p=.06, indicating that 
participants were more likely to hire an underpaid domestic worker through Super Cleaners for 
below the minimum wage (M=3.61, SD=4.06), than to hire a domestic worker directly (M=3.05, 
SD=3.31).  
Results – Joint Evaluation 
The joint evaluation condition was analyzed using a paired samples t-test. The results 
revealed a significant effect t(238) = 2.10, p < .04, indicating that participants were less likely to 
hire the domestic worker through Super Cleaners (M=3.44, SD=3.31) than to hire the domestic 
worker directly (M=3.92, SD=3.34).  
Discussion 
When situations were evaluated separately, participants reported that they would be more 
willing to hire an underpaid worker when the transaction was indirect. When situations were Indirect Agency -26- 
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evaluated jointly however, participants focused more on the consequences of the transaction, and 
reported being more likely to hire a worker who was paid more even though the transaction was 
direct. 
These results further demonstrate the role of indirect agency, and further suggest that the 
consequences of indirect agency may hold for purchase decisions as well as third-party moral 
judgment. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Four studies explored the moral psychology of indirect agency. Experiments 1A, 1B, and 
1C revealed a moral preference for indirect agency under conditions favoring intuitive judgment 
(separate evaluation). This preference for indirectness was reversed under conditions of joint 
evaluation, which favors reflective judgment. Experiment 2A demonstrated that the effect of 
indirect agency on intuitive judgment is not merely an effect of perceived foreknowledge or 
control on the part of the primary agent. Participants favored indirect action even when the 
secondary agent was explicitly described as an instrument of the primary agent, contracted to do 
its bidding. Results of Experiment 2B suggest that reflective moral judgment takes indirect 
agency into account, but only insofar as it signals reduced foreknowledge and/or control on the 
part of the primary agent. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that the effect of indirect agency is 
in part caused by a failure to automatically consider potentially dubious motives behind acts of 
indirect agency. Consistent with this hypothesis, highlighting such motives beforehand reduced 
the effect of indirect agency. Experiment 4 demonstrates the effect of indirect agency for 
purchase intention.  
What, then, is the cause of the preference for indirect acts? Experiments 2A and 2B speak 
against two plausible explanations (attribution of reduced foreknowledge and/or control). The Indirect Agency -27- 
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latter explanation posits a diffusion of responsibility (Darley and Latane, 1968) from the primary 
agent to the secondary agent when the primary agent’s control over the secondary agent is in 
question. If the diffusion of responsibility explanation is correct, then diffusion requires no 
perceived lack of control on the part of the primary agent. That is, even when the primary agent 
is in complete control of the action, the mere existence of a secondary agent may be enough to 
create a perception of diffused responsibility. Note that the “diffusion” metaphor presupposes a 
fixed quantity of responsibility. A tendency to think of blame and responsibility as fixed 
quantities to be apportioned among agents may therefore be an important facilitating factor in the 
indirect agency effect.  
  Is the leniency toward indirect harmful agency a decision bias? The data suggest that it is. 
The joint/separate reversals observed in Experiment 1 are logically inconsistent and cannot be 
rationally defended. The question is whether it is the separate evaluation or the joint evaluation 
(or both) that is the source of the irrationality. It does not automatically follow that joint 
evaluations are superior to separate evaluations. Joint evaluation may lead one to discount 
important factors that are best appreciated intuitively or to overemphasize relatively unimportant 
factors that are consciously accessible and amenable to comparison (Bazerman et al., 1998). 
Nevertheless, we maintain that the preference for indirect agency observed under separate 
evaluation is not rational for two reasons. First, Experiments 2A and 2B rule out what we regard 
as the two most plausible justifications for favoring indirect actions. Second, Experiment 3 
suggests that the effect of indirect agency depends largely on a failure to attend to possible 
motivations for acting indirectly. 
  In terms of broader theory, the present results are consistent with Greene et al.’s dual-
process theory of moral judgment (2001, 2004, 2007), according to which moral judgment is Indirect Agency -28- 
  28 
shaped by controlled cognitive processes that are highly sensitive to the consequences of actions 
as well as by automatic/intuitive processes that are often emotional and susceptible to bias. The 
current study adds to the dual process theory by specifying the conditions under which controlled 
cognitive versus automatic/intuitive processes are more likely to dominate.  The present results 
are harder to reconcile with traditional rationalist theories of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969) 
because of the clear irrationality involved in joint/separate reversals. The present results are also 
in tension with Haidt’s (2001) Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), according to which moral 
judgment is driven primarily by intuitive emotional responses. The challenge for the SIM is to 
explain the results of joint evaluation conditions, where judgments appear to be based primarily 
on the magnitude of harmful consequences. Judgments under joint evaluation appear to involve a 
conscious comparison involving an explicit normative metric (“Causing more harm is more 
unethical”)—i.e. consequentialist moral reasoning. The SIM does make room for moral 
reasoning in exceptional cases, and one may argue that JE is exceptional. 
  A bias that favors indirect harms may have implications for how crimes are punished in 
our legal system. In the case of murder, the United States law does not differentiate between 
murder that is carried out directly and murder that is carried out indirectly
 (United States v. 
Simmons 2006). For example, if a mobster hires a hit man to kill his associate, he may be 
convicted of first degree murder based on the evidence that he solicited and facilitated murder. In 
this case, the law is no more lenient when a secondary agent is involved. The present research 
suggests that juries, on the other hand, may be biased to look more favorably on indirect harms 
and thus less likely to deliver guilty verdicts when harm is committed through a secondary agent.  Indirect Agency -29- 
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Conclusion 
  It is possible that Merck’s decision to sell its cancer drugs to Ovation was entirely 
innocent. But, if their decision was a deceptive strategy, it may have been more clever than they 
realized. Acting indirectly through another can hide the fact that one has caused harm, hide the 
fact that one knowingly chose to cause harm, and hide the extent of one’s control over the 
harmful outcome. But the present results indicate that causing harm indirectly through another 
can protect harm-doers, and thus harm society, in a more subtle and insidious way. This is 
important to know, given that many of the greatest crimes against society are perpetrated by 
powerful people who carry out their intentions through others. The present results suggest that 
heightened awareness of people’s sometimes dubious motivations for acting indirectly, and the 
organizational structures that facilitate them, may be a useful safeguard against the abuse of 
power. 
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Figure 1. Ratings of Ethicality in Separate Evaluation (SE) from Experiment 2A. Error bars 
represent standard error. 
Ratings of Ethicality in SE (Experiment 2A) Indirect Agency -34- 
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Figure 2. Ratings of Ethicality in Joint Evaluation (JE) from Experiment 2B. Error bars 
represent standard error. 
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